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Abstract 
The article explores the relation between identity definition and trust in different information 
sources in Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia following the 2011 Uprisings. While prior to 2011 
literature mostly highlighted the role of pan-Arab news channels in consolidating a 
transnational Arab public sphere, recent studies argued that there has been a reinforcement 
of national media and identities in the Middle East and North Africa, as a consequence of a 
partial liberalisation of national broadcasting. Our study is based on the Arab 
Transformations survey (2014), which unlike previous surveys included questions covering 
both media consumption and identity definition. We looked at how in the three countries the 
choice of Muslim, Arab or national identity definition was associated with the preference for 
distinct sources of political news. The results only partially confirmed the hypothesis of a 
renewed importance of national media and showed that in the three countries people tended 
to attribute very different values to the same news sources. 
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Introduction 
This article builds on the intersection of two fields of study – that of social and political 
identity definition and that of media consumption – to explore attitudes towards national and 
international news sources in three Arab countries following the 2011 Uprisings. Our analysis 
is based on data from Arab Transformations (AT), a survey carried out in 2014 in six Arab 
countries.1 While previous surveys in the MENA region did not cover both domains of media 
consumption and identity definition, nor include detailed and comparable sets of questions, 
AT data allowed us to explore the two dimensions separately and their interaction. The article 
therefore aims at contributing to a research area which has rarely been supported by 
empirical data – with very few exceptions, such as Nisbet and Myers (2010) – by looking at 
the cases of Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia after 2011. 
The nexus between media use and identity definition has been traditionally explored in 
relation to the building or reinforcement of national communities (Anderson, 1983; 
Habermas, 1989). Within the MENA region, the set-up of state broadcasting systems in the 
post-colonial era also served the nation-building process and the consolidation of 
authoritarian regimes (Ayish, 2002; Hafez, 2001; Rugh, 2004). However, since the end of the 
1990s, the focus of most media scholars started to shift from the national to the transnational 
level of media production and consumption, as the rise of satellite television, first from 
Europe and then from the Gulf countries, broadened the choice of available channels in the 
region (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999; el-Nawaway and Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006). 
The consolidation of a transnational Arab and Muslim identity in the MENA region in fact has 
often been associated with the growing visibility of pan-Arab satellite television since the 
1990s (Cherribi, 2006; El Oifi, 2005), and later on with the rise of the digital media domain, 
from blogs to social networks (Allaoui and Kuebler, 2011; Faris, 2013; Lynch, 2007). 
After 2011, however, the consolidation of a pan-Arab public and identity seems to have been 
interrupted. According to several observers, following the Uprisings the popularity of pan-
Arab media started to decline, while at the same time new and old national broadcasters 
started to gain larger shares of the national audiences (Guaaybess, 2013; Kraidy, 2014; 
Mellor, 2013; Sarnelli and Kobibi, 2017). We tested this hypothesis with empirical data from 
the AT survey and found very different results in each of the three countries. 
Among the six countries covered by the AT survey (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, 
Iraq), we selected for the purpose of this study Tunisia, a republic going through a process of 
radical political transformation, and Morocco and Jordan, two authoritarian monarchies which 
resisted the 2011 ‘revolutionary wave’. We deliberately excluded countries which are 
undergoing a phase of authoritarian restoration (Egypt) or of civil war (Libya, Iraq), as their 
unstable condition would make it more difficult to explore and compare results. 
The article aims therefore to confront some broader theoretical issues on media and identity 
in the MENA region with empirical data from the AT survey. Given the lack of previous 
equivalent data, we cannot compare our results with pre-2011 trends. However, we can 
discuss them in relation to the recent literature and suggest possible future investigations. 
We will also focus on the differences among age cohorts, given the importance often 
attributed to young people's role within the Uprisings (Howard and Hussain, 2011; Wilson 
and Dunn, 2011). Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 1 provide the sample sizes and the main 
socio-demographic characteristics of the samples. 
We tried to address the following questions: How are the post-2011 political and social 
changes in the three countries reflected by the preference for different information sources? 
What are the main definitions of identity chosen in the three countries? Is there a correlation 
between the preference for a certain identity definition and the trust in some information 
sources (national or international, traditional or digital)? 
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We argue that the combined analysis of news media choice and identity definition can offer a 
useful perspective on the relation between national and supranational identity in the light of 
the social and political transformations reshaping the MENA region. In particular, 
respondents in each country seem to attribute very different levels of trust to the same media 
sources even when choosing the same identity definition (Muslim, Arab, national identity). 
Against new and old forms of technological determinism – emphasising, in turn, the capacity 
of pan-Arab channels to encourage transnational solidarity, and of social media to promote 
political change – our data show that distinct national contexts can inform very different 
media choices, and reflect the post-2011 divergent political paths taken by Tunisia, Jordan 
and Morocco. 
Media in Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia after 2011 
After 2011, Tunisia started a gradual – although bumpy – ride towards democratic reforms; 
Morocco and Jordan, two monarchies, implemented some minor political reforms, with 
different degrees of support and participation, but their authoritarian structures managed to 
resist the ‘revolutionary wave’ which shook the region. These political differences are also 
somehow reflected in the three countries' media systems. 
Moroccan media before and after 2011 
The state monopoly on broadcasting in Morocco was lifted in 2002, but the process of media 
liberalisation that followed was ‘an incoherent one’ (El Issawi, 2012). Currently Morocco has 
nine domestic television channels, of which seven are government owned, one is private and 
one is of mixed ownership. Television, therefore, is still a symbol of the regime's sovereignty, 
while liberalisation was mostly confined to radio: there are 18 private radio stations today (El 
Issawi, 2012; Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011). The government announced the awarding of new 
television licenses in 2012, but the reform has stalled since then. Press law in Morocco 
explicitly prohibits criticism of the monarchy and Islam, and effectively bars criticism of other 
taboo subjects (Freedom House, 2015b). 
Following the 2011 protests, the monarchy promoted a constitutional reform, also reinforcing 
the freedom of the press. However, the gap between written principles and unwritten 
practices continues to be evident. Several trials to journalists have recently been based on 
charges like ‘threatening state security’ or ‘failing to report foreign financing’. Particularly 
terrorism-related investigations, Western Sahara and the reputation of King Mohammed VI 
continue to form ‘grey areas’ that can land reporters in prison (Freedom House, 2015b). 
Tunisian media before and after 2011 
Following a series of reforms, the media system in Tunisia saw significant openings after 
2011. However, the new institutional framework is still ‘subject to the inconsistencies and 
difficulties of a post-revolutionary transition period’ (Ghazali, 2015: 3). 
Television in Tunisia was opened to the private sector in 2003, but what took place, as in 
other fields, was a liberalisation mainly promoting the ruling clan's interests. As a result, until 
2011, many dissident channels, such as El Hiwar Ettounsi, were broadcasting from abroad to 
escape government control. After the Revolution, though, this and other channels relocated 
to Tunisia, switching from satellite to terrestrial and becoming mainstream national channels. 
In 2014, the new Independent Broadcasting Authority granted licenses to more than 20 new 
outlets, although some of them later dissolved. Tunisia's new constitution, adopted in 
January 2014, also contained numerous protections for media independence. However, the 
charter also left in force some remnants of the Ben Ali era, such as possible arbitrary 
restrictions on journalists, or charges of defamation. Moreover, the legacy of Tunisia's 
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authoritarian system is still present in the media system in the form of financial, political and 
security constraints (Ghazali, 2015; Lynch, 2015), and journalists continue to operate in 
difficult professional conditions (El Issawi, 2012). Nevertheless, compared to the pre-2011 
scenario, the result is a much greater diversity of political voices. 
Jordan media before and after 2011 
Also in Jordan a series of media reforms were introduced well before the 2011 Uprisings – in 
1997, 1998 and 2004 – but the current media environment still seems to be very ‘vulnerable 
to political interference’ (Murphy, 2011: 967). State-owned Jordan Radio and TV had until 
recently almost no competitors for the coverage of national political issues, given the extra 
financial surcharge required to private broadcasters wishing to cover such topics. In 
September 2012, the Audiovisual Commission lifted these fees on political content, although 
the state continued to keep its control through less formal restraints (Sweis and Baslan, 
2013: 29).  
In 2011, Jordanian youth activists, like their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, organised 
their political initiatives mostly through social media (Ryan, 2011: 573). After that, an 
increasing amount of control measures targeted the online media sector. The 2012 Press 
Law introduced the requirement for news websites to obtain expensive licenses from the 
state. Following this provision, some 300 news websites were blocked by the government, as 
they failed to adhere to new registration and licensing provisions. In 2014, new amendments 
to the antiterrorism law also included restrictions on freedom of speech related to national 
security issues, resulting in the arrest or intimidation of several journalists and activists 
(Freedom House, 2015a). 
A changing regional mediascape? 
Overall, the 2011 protests had a significant effect on the regional media environment, and 
introduced or emphasised some important differences among MENA countries. Several 
authors noticed a return to a national perspective (Guaaybess, 2013; Mellor, 2013; Sarnelli 
and Kobibi, 2017) or ‘a renaissance of national broadcasting’ (Kraidy, 2014) following the 
Uprisings. This process coincided with the decreasing popularity and credibility of pan-Arab 
broadcasters like Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera, despite the fundamental role they played during 
the protests in Tunisia and Egypt in connecting online and offline protesters (Sarnelli, 2013). 
In fact, it seems that when further revolts in other countries were met with violent government 
repression and ultimately resulted in civil wars, the mistrust towards these outlets started to 
increase, as their coverage ‘degenerated into an arena for regional power struggles’ (Lynch, 
2015: 93), despite some important exceptions (like the successful ‘Al Hadath’ news channel 
launched by Al Arabiya network in 2012). In the following paragraphs we will confront the 
‘national broadcasting renaissance’ hypothesis with empirical data from Morocco, Tunisia 
and Jordan. 
Main sources of political information: Questions from the AT survey 
One of the questions in the AT questionnaire was ‘what are the main sources of political 
information for you?’ (see Table 7, Appendix 1). Respondents could indicate more than one 
option, choosing from traditional media (newspapers, radio, television), digital media and 
telecommunication (internet, email, text messages, social media) and ‘offline social media’ 
(friends and colleagues, public spaces, word of mouth). For newspapers, radio and 
television, the list also included a further differentiation among national state-funded, national 
private and international outlets. This distinction allowed us to test the hypothesis of the new 
relevance of national media that according to some observers characterised the aftermath of 
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the 2011 revolts. 
Our focus on sources of political information, instead of information in general, was motivated 
by the generally stronger alignment of political information between nationalist and 
internationalist, or pro- and anti-government perspectives. 
These sources are also the ones which are first targeted by national authorities in times of 
crisis, to influence public opinion and gather support around new government policies. 
Before and after AT, other surveys such as World Values Survey (WVS), Arab Barometer 
and Afro Barometer investigated the frequency of use of different information sources in the 
MENA region, each of them using a different list of media.2 In all these cross-sectional 
surveys, the data collection is carried out using a common questionnaire, translated into 
Arabic and its local variants.1 While Arab Barometer asks about sources of political news, the 
other two surveys consider only generic sources of news. The different formulation of the 
question might affect the respondents' interpretation, as one could prefer different sources for 
different contents (e.g., the internet for political news and television for ‘soft news’). 
Moreover, unlike AT, investigating the preferred sources, the other surveys refer to the 
frequency of use – which in many cases could be affected by coverage and access to the 
media sources. The question on preference, instead, allows a focus on the choice of the 
respondent. 
Furthermore, the question on trust in media sources, based on the same list of options, 
allowed us to explore also how the public reacted to the reforms targeting both traditional and 
digital media. In contrast, other surveys did not include questions on trust in the media (Afro 
Barometer) or only consider traditional media such as newspapers and television (WVS). 
Arab Barometer's last waves included a detailed section on media, with questions on 
frequency, trust and purposes of use of media sources; however, the fact that frequency of 
use is preferred to choice, and even more that social media are not considered, makes these 
data less useful. 
Apart from comparing the results from the three countries, we also looked at cross-
generational comparisons. Most of the recent debate on media in the MENA region focused 
in fact on generational differences, and particularly on how Arab youth used social media 
during the 2011 protests (Hoffman and Jamal, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2011). Several 
studies also analysed critically the emergence of digital-based citizen journalism in the region 
(Onodera, 2011; Sreberny and Khiabany, 2010), although this phenomenon is beyond the 
scope of our study. In general, the definition of ‘youth’ adopted by most literature is often 
controversial (Murphy, 2012; Wilson and Dunn, 2011). The dynamic of the protests in Tunisia 
and Egypt suggests that the most active offline and online protesters ranged from teenagers 
to young adults. As Chouikha (2015) suggested for Tunisia, the relation between the ‘media 
activists’ of the 1999-2000 and the ‘cyber-dissidents’ of the 2000-2011 was defined by 
continuity, not rupture, despite some important differences between the two generations. For 
the purpose of our analysis the age of the respondents was coded into three groups, 
following a classification already adopted for the AT report on youth and social media 
(Vincent et al., 2016). Following this classification, ‘young’ were defined as respondents 
between 18 and 35 years old – according to the hypothesis of a ‘delayed transition’ to 
adulthood caused by social and economic blockages (Dhillion and Yousef, 2009) – while 
respondents between 36 and 55 were the ‘middle-aged’, and those aged 56 or more were 
included in the oldest group. 
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News sources in Morocco 
Main sources of political information in Morocco 
The main difference among age groups in Morocco, based on AT data, seemed to concern 
the preference of internet-based media over other sources of political information (Table 1). 
This value was much higher for the youngest generation, but also a third of the 36-55 age 
group indicated the same preference. According to recent investigations, the number of 
internet users in Morocco grew by an estimated 60% from 2005 to 2010, although access is 
still limited mostly to urban areas and to educated segments of the population (Zaid and 
Ibahrine, 2011). 
One distinctive element of the Moroccan media landscape is the popularity that radio stations 
enjoy among all age groups. One major reason for the success of the 
Table 1. Mentioned sources of political news by age groups, Morocco (%). 
 18-35 36-55 56+ 
Newspaper    
Government newspapers 22.6 22 14.3 
Private national newspapers 23.5 23.7 20 
International newspapers 11.2 11.4 10.3 
TV    
Government TV 38.3 36.1 46.9 
Private national TV 34.2 38.9 35.4 
International TV 49.6 45.4 38.9 
Radio    
Government radio 19 19.7 28.6 
Private national radio 22 21.7 22.3 
International radio 23.2 23.8 22.9 
Internet and new media    
Internet 46.7 29.3 15.4 
Email 7.6 5.3 2.9 
Text messages 5.6 4.3 2.9 
Social media 19 13.6 8 
Other    
Friends and colleagues 23.7 18.2 22.3 
Public places 16.3 16.1 20 
Word of mouth 15.7 11.3 13.1 
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private radio stations launched after 2002 is the choice of a language which, compared to the 
more formal language of state media, is closer to everyday Moroccan Arabic, creating an 
image of a young and dynamic medium also through the use of social networks pages 
(Miller, 2012: 27; Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011: 6). As for the newspapers, their relatively high 
popularity compared to the other two countries can be seen as the legacy of a phase of 
greater independence of the press which started with the reign of Mohammed VI (1999), 
although it was again reduced shortly after by the introduction of new forms of government 
control (Baylocq and Granci, 2012: 12). 
The youngest and the oldest generation seem to make quite different choices also in terms 
of television channels. While almost 47% of the over-56 group expressed a preference for 
national television, about 49% of the 18-35 group indicated international channels as their 
main source. 
In sum, despite the delayed liberalisation of the television sector, and therefore the limited 
role of national independent channels, three years after 2011 the media landscape in 
Morocco seemed to include a plurality of media and formats, providing space for a political 
debate which was not appeased by the constitutional reforms (Bennafla and Seniguer, 
2011). 
Trust in national/international television in Morocco 
In Morocco, not only the preference for, but also the reputation of international news 
channels was considerably higher than that of national channels, especially for the first two 
age groups (Figure 1). The limited trust in national channels could 
 
Figure 1. Trust in TV as source of political information by age groups, Morocco (%). 
 
be related to the persisting hold the monarchy has on the sector, particularly with the public 
service stations, 2M and Al Oula (Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011: 7). 
Government-owned national television seems to be challenged both by local and 
transnational outlets also in terms of language and formats, as it is still mostly characterised 
by the use of formal Arabic or formal French (Zaid and Ibahrine, 2011: 8), unlike the private 
local alternatives (Miller, 2012: 16), and does not offer the benefits of a more independent 
coverage provided by satellite channels. 
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News sources in Tunisia 
Main information sources in Tunisia 
The preference for internet-based media appeared to be quite high among young people but 
also relatively high among other age groups in Tunisia. Among internet-based media and 
telecommunications, social media were by far the most important source for political news in 
the country (Table 2), in line with previous findings from a 2010 survey (Touati, 2012: 8). 
Table 2. Mentioned sources of political news by age groups, Tunisia (%). 
 18-35 36-55 56+ 
Newspaper    
Government newspapers 8.5 14.7 12.1 
Private national newspapers 24.3 28.4 18.3 
International newspapers 11.3 12.5 12.8 
TV    
Government TV 25.4 29.8 25.3 
Private national TV 61.4 65.7 63.3 
International TV 43.9 44.9 38.1 
Radio    
Government radio 19.1 21.3 19.4 
Private national radio 40.8 45.4 49.1 
International radio 12.9 12.3 9.7 
Internet and new media    
Internet 38 13.2 9.3 
Email 7.6 3.3 2.4 
Text messages 3.8 2.6 2.1 
Social media 33.6 14.7 6.9 
Other    
Friends and colleagues 30.4 22.5 22.8 
Public places 11.7 12.1 8.7 
Word of mouth 9.1 11.3 8.3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Trust in TV as source of political information by age groups, Tunisia (%). 
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Another distinctive aspect emerging from the Tunisian data is the distribution of the 
preferences in the television domain, following the post-revolutionary reforms. The popularity 
of state-funded television in Tunisia is in fact much lower than in Morocco and Jordan and is 
largely surpassed by the preference for private national channels. International television 
channels and private radio stations also score higher than state channels. 
As for the press sector, post-revolutionary changes also included the creation of new 
magazines and newspapers, and the disappearance of others connected with the old ruling 
party (Touati, 2012: 6). Also in this case, the new private sector seems to have met the 
approval of the public. 
Trust in national/international television in Tunisia 
The high number of respondents indicating trust in private channels seems to confirm the 
relevance of the post-revolutionary reforms in Tunisia, even though for the youngest 
generation the trust in transnational channels is also very high (Figure 2). These two types of 
TV channels are probably associated with different sets of qualities. While transnational 
satellite channels have a consolidated (although at times controversial) reputation for 
professionalism and independence, the new post-revolutionary channels are highly 
heterogeneous in terms of both form and content. As underlined by Amamou (2016), these 
channels finally reflect the composition, and the internal divisions, of Tunisian society, after 
the previous regime tried for decades to ‘even out’ its mediated representation (Amamou, 
2016: 11). After an initial revolutionary crisis, it seems however that the reformed state-
funded television might already be regaining its audience share: in a 2012 national poll, the 
evening newscast of Al Wataniya 1 was again the most popular (Amamou, 2016: 12). 
Although this new positive trend for state-funded television is not evident from AT data, both 
state-funded and private national channels in Tunisia are surely experimenting with new 
ways to get closer to their audience, based on popular entertainment programmes but also 
on the style and reliability of their newscasts. 
 
 
 
News sources in Jordan 
Main sources of information in Jordan 
Also in Jordan, the gap in the preference for internet-based sources between the younger 
generation and the other groups is quite substantial. However, for all the age groups, 
television appears to be the main source of political information, with an almost equal 
distribution among state-funded, private and international channels (Table 3). 
Although the proportion of the population that regularly accesses the internet in Jordan has 
risen significantly in the last few years,3 access remains limited 
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Table 3. Mentioned sources of political news by age groups, Jordan (%). 
 18-35 36-55 56+ 
Newspaper    
Government newspapers 16.9 16.7 17.7 
Private national newspapers 5.9 7.6 7.3 
International newspapers 3.8 2.9 3.6 
TV    
Government TV 41.9 49.6 51.7 
Private national TV 39.4 52 56.4 
International TV 41.1 54.8 53.5 
Radio    
Government radio 8.4 9.9 8.3 
Private national radio 5.3 7.5 8.1 
International radio 3.3 3.7 4.9 
Internet and new media    
Internet 37.3 20.3 8.8 
Email 0.9 0.4 0.5 
Text messages 1.2 0.4 0.3 
Social media 7 3.5 2.9 
Other    
Friends and colleagues 16.7 16.7 19.7 
Public places 3.7 4.4 8.1 
Word of mouth 12 12.7 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trust in TV as source of political information by age groups, Jordan (%). 
especially in rural areas (Pies and Madanat, 2011; Sweis and Baslan, 2013). Moreover, the 
fact that online media became the main target for new repressive government policies after 
2011 also helped television to remain ‘the only universal medium in Jordan’ (Sweis and 
Baslan, 2013: 6). 
 
11  
Despite the persisting government hold on broadcasting, though, national television is going 
through a phase of gradual transformations. On the one hand, a few national private 
channels, such as Roya TV and Nourmina TV, were introduced in the last few years and, 
according to a recent investigation, are already perceived by the public as more professional 
than state television (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 28). On the other hand, the decade before 
2011 saw regional satellite channels becoming increasingly popular in the country (Pies and 
Madanat, 2011). Because of this national and international competition, JRTV started to 
focus more on localised reporting (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 7). AT data also show that radio 
and newspapers enjoy a limited popularity, and that for newspapers preference is given to 
the government ones, probably due to the legal and economic barriers still faced by 
independent outlets. 
Trust in national/international television in Jordan 
State, private and international television channels in Jordan reach almost the same score 
also in terms of trust, although a slight preference for the private national channels suggests 
that some form of change might be taking place (Figure 3). For the time being, though, the 
government reaffirmed its tight control on the sector on more than one occasion. In 2012 for 
example, Josat TV, one of the few private competitors, lost its license over opinions 
expressed by a guest during a programme, and was charged with ‘inciting against the 
regime’ and ‘undermining the king's dignity’ (Sweis and Baslan, 2013: 8). Such legal 
repressive measures have been combined with extra-legal interventions, starting with the 
closing of Al Jazeera's office in 2002, and continuing with violent attacks on journalists during 
the 2011 demonstrations. 
As a result, citizens tend to associate the media with government control. Among the 
institutions which ‘absolutely cannot criticise the government’, listed in a 2008 survey, the 
media – including the internet – received the highest score (71%), revealing a generalised 
distrust towards the sector (Pies and Madanat, 2011: 6). In the same survey, 38% of 
Jordanians considered state television to be reliable for local news, where it holds a quasi-
monopoly, but only 9% considered it to be trustworthy for international political news, in 
which it faces competition from pan-Arab channels (Pies and Madanat, 2011: 6). Although 
AT data do not allow us to measure such differences, it is likely that similar patterns have 
continued after 2011, even considering a rise of national private competitors. 
Ethnic, religious or national identity? 
Defining social, political and mediated identity 
While in the past it was more common to think about the concept of identity as a crystallised 
dimension of the human being, nowadays it is generally assumed to be a dynamic concept, 
resulting from the interaction between subjective perceptions and external features. The 
individual's identity is forged from early childhood in an ongoing development through the 
various phases of life, an evolving process of ‘becoming’ (Peek, 2005). The individual 
concept of the self is connected with social structure through mechanisms of belonging that 
define one's social identity. This sense of belonging constitutes therefore a relevant aspect of 
identity development which starts within the primary groups (family) and then continues with 
other significant groups during a lifetime. Feelings of belonging to a nation, ethnicity or 
religion are broadly recognised as extremely significant as markers of both group and 
individual identity (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007). While the national identity dimension reflects 
a connection with territory and is frequently associated with civic and political belonging, 
ethnicity and religion provide a group's members with a shared cultural worldview, offering a 
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base for values, norms, beliefs and practices. National, religious and ethnic identities are 
therefore all incorporated in the multidimensional individual identity. As Stryker and Serpe 
(1994) argued, these different aspects can be organised according to a salience hierarchy. 
Depending on the circumstances, one of these identities may be more relevant in a specific 
cultural setting, defined not only by traditions but also by political choices and relations with 
other groups (Howard, 2000). Governments' policies, as well as media coverage, can 
therefore affect this hierarchy. 
Mass media have long been associated with the emergence and reinforcement of national 
communities, in parallel with the birth of the modern nation state (Anderson, 1983; 
Habermas, 1989; Schlesinger, 2000). Among different media forms, television has often 
been considered particularly influential in the process of national identity formation (Curran, 
2002; Price, 1995). More specifically, the persisting significance of national television news 
for national audiences has been confirmed by recent studies (Aalberg et al., 2013; Riegert, 
2011). On the other hand, internet-based media have been related since the beginning to the 
emergence of a global public sphere, based on the dematerialised social interactions 
supported by digital technologies (Castells, 1996; Sassen, 2003). Despite the enduring 
importance of the intersections between physical and digital spaces (Lovink, 2013; Morley, 
2000), satellite television and the internet have surely contributed to reshape the relation 
between political communities, territories and identities. Within a broader global media 
environment, in fact, digital media do not only nourish pre-existing communities but they also 
contribute to the establishment of new ‘de-territorialised’ ones (Jansson, 1999) and therefore 
potentially encourage more ‘cosmopolitan’ attitudes (Chalaby, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 
2009; Verboord, 2017). 
This expansion of transnational communications has often been discussed in the case of the 
MENA region as a factor reinforcing a Muslim and/or Arab identity (Cherribi, 2006; Lynch, 
2006). Before the recent growth in internet and social media use in the region, the rise of 
transnational identity had been related to the launch of the first generation of satellite news 
channels (Ayish, 2002; el-Nawaway and Iskandar, 2002; Hafez, 2001; Rugh, 2004). Despite 
the frequent association between the growth of regional media and the changing perception 
of collective identity, however, there is a lack of empirical studies connecting the two 
domains, with a very few exceptions, such as that of Nisbet and Myers (2010). In their study, 
based on survey data collected between 2004 and 2008, they found that increased exposure 
to transnational media was associated with more respondents identifying themselves as 
Muslims or Arabs rather than with their nation state (Nisbet and Myers, 2010: 355-358). 
However, the study only considered transnational television and did not include the growing 
sector of online-based media; and, most importantly, the dataset on which the study is based 
is not fully accessible, not allowing for a proper comparison over time. 
For limits of space and purpose the following paragraphs will cover only the preference of 
new and old media in relation with the perceived identity definition three years after the 2011 
Uprisings. We will look first at the hierarchy among different identity definitions in the three 
countries, and then at how the dimension of identity can be related with different degrees of 
trust in various news sources. 
Identity definition in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan 
Cross-national surveys can be a valuable instrument to study the relation between media 
preference, trust and identity because they also allow comparisons across countries. 
However, not all the main cross-sectional surveys collect information with the same level of 
detail. AT is in fact the only survey, among those explored so far, that allowed us to study 
possible relations between identity definition and the consumption and trust of media. Other  
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surveys that collect information globally (like WVS) or in the MENA region (Arab Barometer 
or Afro Barometer) do not explore both these aspects or cover the MENA countries (as in the 
case of the International Social Survey Programme). 
As we saw above, individual identity is a complex and multidimensional concept. This 
concept is often investigated in general population surveys mainly considering geographical 
and/or religious and/or ethnic identity. In most of the cases, information about these 
dimensions is collected through different questions. However, to study the possible relation 
between the choice of specific media and a particular dimension of identity it is necessary for 
these different dimensions to be presented to the respondents as competing alternatives. 
This is the case for AT's question, where the available options were as follows: (1) Your 
country of origin; (2) Arab (Ethnicity); (3) Muslim (Religion); (4) Region; (5) Local community, 
place where you live; (6) Other (see Table 8 in Appendix 1). For the purpose of this analysis, 
we collapsed the fourth and fifth option together, as they both indicated a form of belonging 
to sub-national areas, and both obtained a limited amount of preferences from the 
respondents in all the countries. 
A few but significant differences emerged from the answers from Morocco, Jordan and 
Tunisia (Figure 4). In all of them, the prevalent dimension was the national identity, followed 
by the religious one. However, while Morocco and Jordan are almost similar in their 
distribution, in Tunisia people seemed to consider their religious identity less important. 
As most of the previous surveys do not allow for the establishment of a proper hierarchy 
between competing identity definitions, it is almost impossible to draft a longitudinal trend, 
and to explore possible changes following the 2011 events. Some indications, however, can 
be drawn from the results of the Annual Arab 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Do you identify yourself with... (%) by country. 
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Table 4. Identity definition in six Arab countries according to the Annual Arab Public Opinion 
Poll (Telhami, 2010). 
Identity definition       
(average of six countries) 2008 2009 2010 2011 Jordan, 2010 Morocco, 2010 
Muslim 36 32 39 31 15 64 
Home country 39 35 32 33 53 20 
Arab 20 32 25 26 21 4 
Citizen of the world 4 1 4 9 11 11 
Public Opinion Poll (Telhami, 2010), the same survey programme referred to by Nisbet and 
Myers (2010). These results (shown in Table 4), though, are only provided at the aggregate 
level, as the average resulting from six very different countries (Egypt, UAE, Morocco, 
Lebanon, Jordan, KSA) with the exception of the 2010 wave. While the overall picture 
appears quite flat, by looking at specific countries such as Morocco and Jordan (Table 4) it is 
clear that the situation differs greatly from one national context to another. Just as in 2014, 
national identity was the most salient dimension for the Jordanians in 2010 (Figure 4). 
However, the preference for a transnational Arab identity has decreased since then, the 
number of people giving primacy to their religious identity more than doubled in 2014. In 
Morocco, the change goes the other way. While the difference in the salience given to Arab 
identity does not present noticeable differences, those who identify themselves with their 
home country doubled in 2014. Muslim identity, instead, dramatically dropped from 64 to 
38.3%. 
These differences should be taken only as a general orientation, as not only the questions 
but also the sampling strategies adopted for the two surveys were quite different: while the 
Arab Public Opinion Poll used representative samples of great cities in each country, AT also 
covered rural areas (Abbott et al., 2016). In addition, the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll did 
not cover Tunisia. 
Trust in different information sources and identity definition 
We tried to investigate how the preferred identity definitions in the three countries could be 
associated with trust in different information sources. More specifically, we wanted to explore 
whether the choice of one of the options of identity definition included in the AT questionnaire 
had any positive or negative correlation with trust in one kind of information source. The only 
recent example of such correlation is the already mentioned study by Nisbet and Myers 
(2010), which concluded that a higher exposure to pan-Arab news channels corresponded to 
a higher probability of respondents identifying themselves as Arabs or Muslims rather than 
preferring their national identity. Instead of considering exposure to certain media, we chose 
the measure of trust in information sources, as it seems to be a more reliable indicator of 
people's values and their attitudes towards these sources. For the  
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Figure 5. Self-definition of identity and trusted source of political information by country. 
purpose of this investigation, we considered the whole national samples, and selected the 
most popular media options among the ones included in the AT questionnaire: national 
private TV, government-owned TV, international TV and new media (including both internet 
and social networks). In what follows, we will point out some of the results of this combination 
in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, by focusing on the difference among Muslim (1), Arab (2) or 
national (3) identity which were the most popular choices in the three countries. 
1. Preference for Muslim identity. In Tunisia, 29.6% of the people identified themselves as 
Muslims (Figure 4). As displayed in Figure 5, almost half of this share (44.6%) trusted 
private national channels, less than one-third trusted international television and one-fifth 
the new media. Only a small portion (7.1%) expressed trust in national channels. This 
distribution could be explained by the fact that among the new channels born after 2011, 
several express religious views. More generally, this also shows that the preference for a 
religious identity dimension does not necessarily imply a detachment from the national 
political sphere – in fact, the party winning the first post-revolutionary elections in 2011 
was the moderate religious party Ennahda. 
In Morocco, the respondents identifying themselves as Muslims are 38.8% of the whole 
Moroccan sample (Figure 4) and, compared to the Tunisian, showed a different 
distribution in their trust in the sources of information (Figure 5). Most of them (38.9%) 
trusted new media and international televisions (34.9%). The governmental national 
channels did not find a big support among this group (only 14.5%), and even less did the 
private ones (11.7%). This might indicate that respondents identifying themselves as 
Muslims in Morocco might not feel well represented by the ‘institutional’ religious 
organisations (such as the Islamist conservative democrat party PJD, ruling party at the 
time of the survey) and consequently by the national (state-owned, or partially private) 
television channels. By contrast, transnational channels offer a popular alternative, and 
the new media domain showed to be an even more conducive platform for independent 
local initiatives. 
In Jordan, people identifying as Muslims (38.1% of the Jordan sample, see Figure 4) 
seem also to trust mostly international television (31.3%, as shown in Figure 5). Private 
national televisions and new media are considered trustful sources by a similar share of 
people (22.7 and 22.9%), while 23.1% expressed trust in national channels. Muslims in  
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Jordan, as a political category, are often part of opposition parties and organisations, 
such as the Islamic Action Front, which generally represent the views of the Palestinian 
Jordanians, and tend to have a rather tense relationship with the monarchy (Ryan, 2011). 
In this sense, it might be that Muslim identity in Jordan is associated with a higher trust of 
transnational channels as they best represent a dispersed community such as the 
Palestinian one. 
2. Preference for Arab identity. For the small group of respondents identifying themselves 
as Arabs (only 8.6% in Tunisia; 5.9% in Morocco; 6.2% in Jordan), one could have 
expected to find a higher level of trust in the transnational, pan-Arab news channels. 
However, while this is the case in Jordan and in Morocco, it is certainly not so in Tunisia. 
As shown in Figure 5, most of the Moroccans and Jordanians belonging to this group 
(respectively, 38.3 and 38.6%), expressed trust mostly in international televisions, while 
this share among the Tunisian is relatively quite low (24.2%). Surely, the feeling of 
belonging to a given community does not necessarily imply a higher level of trust in the 
media which are considered the most representative of that community, as people might 
disagree on these media's language or representations. Still, there is a wide consensus 
among scholars and media analysts on the role played by pan-Arab news channels in the 
past 20 years in bolstering and promoting a new kind of pan-Arab cultural and social 
identity. This process also probably contributed to building a regional base for the shared 
grievances that resulted in the 2011 revolts. In this sense, the limited popularity of the 
pan-Arab channels in 2014, even among the respondents identifying themselves as 
‘Arabs’, might confirm the mistrust in pan-Arab channels which followed their ambiguous 
coverage of the ‘less successful’ 2011 protests, such as those in Bahrain, in Libya and 
Syria (Lynch, 2015). At the same time, it could also suggest the emergence of new 
national priorities in the aftermath of the revolts, which cannot be covered by 
transnational media but need to be told by ‘local’ voices. This could be in particular the 
case for Tunisia and Jordan where national channels (private and governmental) are 
considered trustful by about half of the subgroups who identify themselves with their 
ethnicity. 
3. Preference for national identity. Finally, if we look at the respondents who chose to 
identify themselves by their nationality (as shown in Figure 4: 42.3% of the Tunisians; 
48.9% of the Moroccans; 50.9% of the Jordanians), one could expect to find a positive 
correlation with trust in national (state-funded) channels, but this does not happen in any 
of the three countries. In general, state-funded national television does not seem to enjoy 
high popularity (as displayed in Figure 5: only 7.3% in Tunisia and 12.2% in Morocco), 
with the partial exception of Jordan (25.1%). This exception could be due to the persisting 
dominant position of state television in the country, and the obstacles still faced by inde-
pendent competitors, although the slight advantage of private television channels 
registered by the AT survey might indicate that some opening-up of the news 
environment is finally happening. Interestingly, in Tunisia, people choosing national 
identity are also the ones trusting mostly new media (35.1%) and transnational television 
(32.1%). This could be a consequence of the ‘revolutionary’ nationalism which supported 
the 2011 protests, and which still does not recognise the newly launched national 
television channels as reliable options when compared with the more established 
transnational sources, or the more independent online networks. A similar picture 
emerges also from Morocco, where trust in transnational television is even higher 
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compared with Tunisia (36.3% versus 32.3%), while is lower the trust in private national 
channels (17.6%, compared to the share in Tunisia – 25.4%, and Jordan – 29%), given 
the very limited amount of independent options available in the country. 
These data overall point towards the apparent paradox of contrasting values characterising 
the relation between identity definition and trust in media sources in Morocco, Jordan and 
Tunisia. However, from these results we can draw a series of useful indications. First of all, 
the data show the importance of considering, in any media analysis, the impact of recent 
political trajectories, which for the region considered resulted in a fragmented and profoundly 
differentiated mediascape rather than in a more homogeneous pan-Arab media space. 
Second, this fragmentation seems to show the limits of ‘technological determinist’ media 
theories, and their recurring tendency to overestimate the importance of one single media 
form – e.g., satellite channels at the end of the 1990s, blogs at the beginning of the new 
millennium and social media after 2011 – in relation to political and social changes. Rather, 
our data reveal composite media systems in which different values can be attributed to 
specific technologies depending on the political, social and cultural context. In this sense, the 
provocative question posed by our title remains open, as what emerges is a picture made of 
distinct and meaningful media recombinations – small and big, regional and local, old and 
new – in each of the countries considered (as already partially anticipated in Sarnelli (2013, 
2014)). 
Conclusions 
We looked at the preference for diverse information sources in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, 
and at how these choices reflect the different social and political environments of the three 
countries in the aftermath of the 2011 events. In Tunisia, the  
post-revolutionary reforms allowed for the creation of a variety of new voices in the domain of 
traditional media. However, the post-revolutionary system is still quite unstable, and some of 
its features might be only temporary. In Morocco, the limited reforms approved by the 
government in the political sphere did not have an equivalent in the news media 
environment. Therefore, there seems to be still a significant division between the media 
outlets that are perceived as more independent (online media, international television, local 
radio stations) and the ones under direct government control (state-funded and private 
national television). Finally, in Jordan, the online news domain seems to be the one that 
suffered the most from a series of repressive government measures following the 2011 
protests. As a result, when the survey was carried out (2014) online news media were not 
perceived as a strong alternative to national television. At the same time, the credibility 
slowly gained by private national channels could increasingly challenge the dominant 
position of the government-owned channels. This variety of national results does not point 
towards a new possible trend in the whole MENA region, but rather towards national 
differences reflecting – and at the same time shaping – the post-2011 changes on several 
levels. 
We started from the hypothesis of a ‘resurgence’ of national media in the MENA area and of 
a decline in popularity of the pan-Arab channels following the 2011 Uprisings (Guaaybess, 
2013; Kraidy, 2014; Lynch, 2015; Mellor, 2013; Sarnelli and Kobibi, 2017). To test this 
hypothesis, we compared the data on trust in state, private and international television 
channels in each country. Among the countries considered, a clear rise in the popularity of 
national news sources emerged only in Tunisia, given the growth of national independent 
outlets which followed the revolution. A more limited increase in the popularity of national  
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independent channels was visible also in Jordan, but still very much susceptible to the 
limitations imposed by the government. In Morocco, liberalisation of the television sector 
continues to be delayed, not allowing for the emergence of independent national alternatives. 
The popularity of pan-Arab broadcasters, in effect, was not particularly high in the three 
countries, with the partial exception of Morocco. This could possibly confirm the hypothesis 
that the reputation of these channels has been damaged by their uneven coverage of the 
2011 protests. However, it could also simply indicate that the current regional fragmentation 
is better represented by local voices, reflecting divergent national priorities. 
In this sense, it seems that the current phase is characterised more by different combinations 
of new and existing information sources, acquiring a different value in each national context, 
rather than by the dominance of one media technology contributing to a specific political 
phase, as it has been often argued for the satellite channels first and more recently for the 
social media. 
We also combined the results of the main identity definitions (Arab, Muslim, national identity) 
with the trust in different information sources (national government TV, national private TV, 
international TV, online media). Based on AT survey data, we found that the relation between 
identity definition and trust in different information sources also varies notably from country to 
country, with the case of Tunisia breaking the most with the pre-2011 context, given the 
extent of the post-revolutionary transformations in the country. 
In general, while previous studies found a positive correlation between exposure to 
transnational television and choice of Arab and Muslim identity definition (Nisbet and Myers, 
2010) our results, although only partially comparable, seem to indicate that this is no more 
the case in the post-2011 scenario. In fact, the respondents identifying themselves as 
Muslims tended to express a higher degree of trust in national television in Tunisia and in 
online media in Morocco, while only in Jordan did they indicate a preference for transnational 
television. At the same time, identification with the home country was matched by higher trust 
in online media in Tunisia, with transnational television in Morocco, and with similar levels of 
national and transnational television in Jordan. If a common pattern emerges, therefore, it is 
that of a further differentiation of national media systems after the Uprisings. In fact, despite 
the difficulties in comparing our data with previous surveys, another factor emerging from our 
analysis is the resurgence of national identities in the post-2011 era, compared to 
transnational identities (Arab, Muslim) in the region, which is perhaps not surprising given the 
profoundly different trajectories experienced by MENA countries after the Uprisings. This 
indicates once again the importance of local settings which can inform the attribution of 
different value to various media formats, depending on how they are perceived by groups in 
relation to their national, ethnic or cultural identity. Following the literature on new media and 
cosmopolitanism (Chalaby, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 2009; Verboord, 2017), digital media 
are often expected to offer a cosmopolitan alternative to traditional national media. However, 
our data showed that the preference for digital news sources in countries like Tunisia or 
Morocco can actually correspond to a stronger identification with national and religious 
identities. 
This phase seems thus to be characterised by new tensions, or rather by a new form of 
coexistence, between national and transnational collective identities, mediated by different 
information sources. To be sure, a regional ‘Arab’ identity is still strong, as it has coexisted 
for decades with the nation-building process in each country (Phillips, 2012). However, this 
identity does not seem to be strongly represented or mediated by transnational pan-Arab 
channels as before. In fact, despite the fundamental role played by pan-Arab television in the 
recent past, as Noemi Sakr (2015: 116) pointed out, ‘transnational channels cannot  
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constitute an alternative to a “national” television system, for practical reasons – that is, they 
cannot offer detailed coverage of all local news – but also symbolic reasons – that is 
representing local diversity, culture and perspective’. This appears to be particularly true in 
times of political transformations. 
In conclusion, it seems that the relationship between identity definition and trust in different 
media sources can offer important insights into the evolving nature of public attitudes in the 
MENA states and should be further explored. Empirical data can help to understand how 
perceptions of collective identity, mediated by different information sources, can reflect 
broader political and social changes. Unfortunately, not all the survey programmes recently 
carried out in the MENA region can support this kind of exploration. We hope that more 
surveys will follow the attempt of AT, allowing researchers to expand its results for 
longitudinal analysis. 
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Notes 
1. The EU-funded AT project collected data though face-to-face interview in 2014 (with a common 
questionnaire, translated into Arabic and its local variants) with representative samples of the 
population in six countries of the Middle East and North Africa: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, 
Morocco and Tunisia (for a summary of the main results see Teti and Abbot, 2018). The sampling 
strategy involved elements of cluster sampling, stratification and simple random selection or 
methods designed to simulate it; its precise application varied from country to country, according 
to local conditions. Despite the possible limits of the use of secondary data, such as the lack of 
direct control over sample selection and data collection by the authors, we can rely on the quality 
of the AT data on the basis of the quality control reports provided by the project. In addition to 
fieldwork monitoring procedures, the quality of the data has been checked after the data collection 
through missing values analysis, construct validity tests and duplication of records checks. In this 
study we applied weights to equalise samples. For more information see the Methods Handbook 
edited by Abbott et al. (2016). After the embargo, the dataset is freely accessible since April 2017 
on the project's website (arabtrans.eu). 
2. Afro Barometer asks about: radio, newspapers, television, internet, social media; Arab Barometer 
uses the same list with the exception of social media; WVS adopts a different list: daily 
newspapers, printed magazines, TV news, radio news, mobile phone, email, internet, talk with 
friends and colleagues. 
3. In 2014 46.2% of Jordanians (compared with 56.8% of Moroccans and 46.16% of Tunisians) were 
using the internet (Abbott et al., 2017; Lomazzi et al., 2017). 
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Appendix 
Table 5. Sample sizes, age and gender distributions within the samples by country. 
 Sample Size  Age (%)    Sex (%)  
 n  18-35 36-55 56+  Male Female 
Jordan 2139  42.9 39.1 18.8  50.3 49.7 
Morocco 1777  56.2 34.8 9.8  49.9 50.1 
Tunisia 1215  41.4 34.8 23.8  50.3 49.7 
 
 
Table 6. Type of settlement and educational level distributions within the samples by country. 
 
Settlement (%)  Education (%) 
Urban Rural  None/elementary Basic Secondary Higher 
Jordan 77.1 22.9  12.9 22.4 48.2 16.5 
Morocco 60.2 39.8  25.9 14.2 30.8 29.0 
Tunisia 64.4 35.6  31.1 11.9 36.3 20.7 
Table 7. Main source of political information: original question from ATs and non-response rate by 
country. 
59a. Please, tell me, what are the main sources of 
political information for you? [several options are 
possible] 
59b. And which sources of information do you trust 
most? [several options are possible] 59a. Main Sources (4) 59b. Trusted sources (4) 
1 Government newspapers 1 1 
2 Private national newspapers 2 2 
3 International newspapers 3 3 
4 Government TV 4 4 
5 Private national TV 5 5 
6 International TV 6 6 
7 Government radio 7 7 
8 Private national radio 8 8 
9 International radio 9 9 
10 Internet 10 10 
11 Email 11 11 
12 Text messages 12 12 
13 Social media 13 13 
14 Friends and colleagues 14 14 
15 Public places (mosque, market) 15 15 
16 Word of mouth (gossip, rumours) 16 16 
17 Other (specify) 17 17 
98 Don't know (do not read) 98 98 
99 Refuse to answer (do not read) 99 99 
Non-response rate in Morocco 2.9% 4.6% 
Non-response rate in Tunisia 4.0% 9.3% 
Non-response rate in Jordan 3.4% 0.7% 
ATs: Arab Transformations.  
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Table 8. Self-definition of identity: original question from ATs and non-response rate by country. 
Q28. If you have been asked to identify yourself, 1. Your country of origin 
with which of the following do you most closely 2. Arab (ethnicity) 
identify yourself? 3. Muslim (religion) 
 4. Region 
 5. Local community, city where I live 
 6. Others 
 98. Don't know (do not read) 
Non-response rate in Morocco 1.5% 
Non-response rate in Tunisia 3.3% 
Non-response rate in Jordan 0.1% 
ATs: Arab Transformations. 
